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Summary
New CNS/ATM concept developments are typically undertaken without feedback from
appropriate safety assessments. Capacity-efficiency enhancements are realised by exploiting
new technology, changing human controller roles and introducing new procedures. However,
effectively supporting demand and safety is more than making sure that every ATM function is
safe.
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1 Introduction
Traditional air traffic management (ATM) design approaches tend first to design advanced
ATM that provides sufficient capacity, and then to extend the design with safety features. The
advantage of this approach is that ATM developments can be organised around the clusters of
individual elements, e.g. communication, navigation, surveillance, automation tools, HMI and
advanced procedures.
The key disadvantage is that safety effects stay unclear: ATM is the result of complex
interactions between human operators, procedures and technical systems (hardware and
software), all highly distributed; these complex interactions significantly determine safety as a
function of demand. Therefore, jointly supporting capacity and safety is more than making sure
that each of the capacity-providing elements is completely safe.
A far more effective approach is to try to design an ATM system that is inherently safe at the
capacity level required. From this perspective, safety assessment should be one of the primary
filters in ATM concept development. An early filtering of ATM design concepts on safety
grounds can potentially avoid a situation where a costly development programme turns out to be
ineffective, or where an even more costly implementation programme fails.
Although understanding this idea is principally not very difficult, it can only be brought into
practice if an ATM safety assessment approach is available that provides appropriate feedback
to the ATM designers already at an early stage of the concept development (Figure 1). This
feedback should not only provide information on whether the design is safe enough, but it
should also identify the safety-capacity bottlenecks.
Figure 1:  Safety feedback based ATM design
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2 Modern Safety Case
For various safety-critical products, services or operations in other domains, the safety
judgement is in general based on a series of documents describing the results of a safety
validation process. Such a series of documents is often referred to as a 'safety case', with the top-
level documents providing the argumentation and the other documents providing the supporting
evidence. By now, consensus is building that appropriate modern safety case approaches are
needed to understand the mechanisms behind designing advanced ATM. It is also recognised
that once such a safety case approach is available, a safety feedback based design approach of
future capacity-efficient ATM will become feasible.
A modern safety case is a living document that is updated on a regular basis, for example when
new hazards have been identified and assessed. The coverage of hazards rather than failure
modes is particularly important if human operators are in the loop of safety-critical services or
operations, since in those cases most hazards are not of the failure mode type. A safety case
should serve as a guide in improving safety at the physical level. This means continual updating
and verification of its application.
A complementary recent development is that top-level management has recognised the modern
safety case as a valuable decision-support management tool during all stages of a safety-critical
operation. For example, during the conceptual development stage of a new safety-critical
operation, management may have to make a decision regarding improving the design or starting
the preparation and procurement for the operational implementation of a new or improved
operation. To be fully informed, management needs the complete picture provided by a modern
safety case, rather than the partial picture provided by several technical evaluations.
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Figure 2. Modern safety case takes safety management and crew/team resource management
into account.
3 Safety metrics
Safety is a general notion that is typically studied from one of three perspectives:
• Safety perception (by pilot, controller, passenger, human society, etc.). An ATM design that
is perceived unsafe will not easily be accepted by the humans involved. A positive
perception about the safety of an ATM design is an implementation-critical requirement.
However, by its very nature, safety perception is a subjective notion, and therefore
insufficient to really base safety cases on.
• Dependability of a technical system (of a computer program, an aircraft navigation system,
a satellite based communication system, etc.). Dependability metrics are objective and are
widely studied in literature. However, they have been developed to cover technical systems
only and not the human operators and procedures of ATM.
• Accident risk (e.g. for 1st, 2nd and 3rd parties in air transport) metrics are objective and are
commonly in use for other human-controlled safety-critical operations such as chemical and
nuclear industries. Two well-known ICAO-adopted accident risk metrics are used for
collision of an aircraft with another aircraft during en route phase, or with fixed obstacles
during landing. Related metrics exist for wake vortex induced risk.
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In view of the ATM safety assessment needs, the accident risk perspective has the best joint
characteristics:
• It implies the use of objective risk metrics;
• It has proven its usability to human-controlled safety-critical operations;
• It is supported by ICAO.
In this article ATM safety will be considered from the accident risk perspective.
4 Established approaches
Accident risk assessment problems have been widely studied for other safety-critical operations,
such as in the nuclear and chemical industries, for these applications, numerous techniques and
tools have been developed. To take maximal advantage of this existing knowledge, The
National Aerospace Laboratory made a thorough study of the applicability of these techniques
to accident risk assessment in air traffic.
A large variety of techniques were identified, from qualitative hazard identification methods
such as preliminary hazard analysis, common cause analysis and failure mode and effect
analysis, to static assessment techniques such as fault tree analysis and event tree analysis, and
dynamic assessment techniques such as Petri net modelling, Markov chain modelling and
dynamic event trees.
So far, only relatively simple ATM situations could be handled by these established techniques.
The key finding is that the established techniques fail to support a systematic approach towards
modelling stochastic dynamical behaviour over time, for complex interactions of highly
distributed ATM (Figure 3). These techniques would therefore force one to adopt a rather
heuristic type of argumentation in trying to capture the complex interactions inherent to
advanced ATM.
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Figure 3: Potential fatalities and distribution level of ATM and other safety-critical activities.
Another problem with many established techniques exists due to the rarity of fatal air traffic
accidents. For air traffic, the fatal accident risks should be of the order of 10-7 - 10-10 per aircraft
flight hour. To develop some feeling of the difficulty to assess such rare events, it is quite
helpful to understand why the well-known fast-time simulators such as National Airspace
Systems Performance Analysis Capability (NASPAC), Recognised ATC Mathematical
Simulator (RAMS) and Total Airspace and Airport Modeller (TAAM) fall short of that
objective.
One major shortcoming of these tools is that they are not really capable of simulating the
aviation safety-critical combinations of non-nominal events; for example, they often do not even
simulate the single non-nominal events. Another major shortcoming is that an accident rate of,
for example, 10-9 per aircraft flight hour cannot, in a reasonably practical way, be assessed using
a straightforward simulation, since this would require a simulation of 1010 aircraft flight hours.
This problem is well illustrated by the ATM safety iceberg (Figure 4). To assess a catastrophic
accident rate, one really needs to deconstruct the risk assessment problem into an effective
hierarchy of simpler conditional assessment problems, where simpler refers to an appropriate
combination of scope (e.g. volume of airspace) and depth (i.e. level of model detail) at each
conditional assessment level.
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Figure 4:  ATM safety iceberg
5 Human cognition modelling
When assessing ATM safety, an essential role is played by procedures, human operators, and
their responsibilities. At present, the view on human reliability has shifted from a context-free
error centred approach in which unreliability is modelled by failures of human information
processing, towards a contextual perspective in which human actions are the product of human
internal states, strategies and the environment.
By now, it is a widely accepted belief that for the modelling of the human, the established
human reliability analysis (HRA) techniques fall short for complex situations, and that the aim
should be for contextual performance models that are based on generally applicable human
cognition and responsibility principles. Moreover, in HRA widely used skill-, rule- and
knowledge-based errors essentially do not make allowances, for example, for situations where
the operator chooses to let a more urgent problem receive attention when the subjectively
available time is short, or when a heavy workload causes them to make quick decisions, without
bothering excessively about the quality of those decisions. It should be noticed that these effects
are inextricably bound with human flexibility and the ability of humans to deal with unforeseen
situations. When assessing ATM safety, it is necessary to consider these aspects of human
performance.
The main benefits expected from contextual models is that they provide better feedback to
designers and that they also remove the need to use overly conservative individual submodels
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for relevant operator actions that may blur understanding of how safety is achieved in ATM. To
develop appropriate models for this, mathematicians and psychologists are jointly developing
high-level models of human cognition performance, in a sequence of studies. Currently, this
collaboration has led to a novel contextual human task-network model, which effectively
combines the control modes of Hollnagel with the multiple resources theory of Wickens, the
classical slips/lapses model of Rasmussen and the human capability to recover errors. In
addition to this, the National Aerospace Laboratory has developed a model for the evolution of
situational awareness errors.
6 TOPAZ methodology
The Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer (TOPAZ) methodology has been
developed to provide feedback on safety/capacity to designers of advanced ATM, following
each (re)design cycle. Figure 5 gives an illustrative overview of how such feedback is obtained.
Figure 5: TOPAZ risk assessment cycle.
During each risk assessment cycle two types of assessments are conducted: first a qualitative
safety assessment (upper drawings in Figure 5), and then a quantitative safety assessment
(middle and lower drawings). The qualitative assessment starts with a systematic gathering of
information about nominal and non-nominal behaviour of the concept design considered,
concerning the human roles, the procedures, the technical systems, etc, with involvement of
relevant experts. For the gathering of non-nominal information, explicit use is made of
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structured hazard identification sessions with a variety of experts, and hazard data bases (upper
middle drawing).
The resulting list of identified potential hazards is subsequently analysed using established
qualitative hazard analysis techniques, to identify the safety-critical encounter scenarios and
associated hazards, to select one or more of those safety-critical encounter scenarios for
quantitative safety assessment, and to develop a modular system engineering type of
representation of the ATM design (upper right drawing). Such modular representation is easily
recognisable and understood by ATM designers and therefore it also supports effective
communication between ATM designers and safety analysts.
From this point on, the TOPAZ assessment cycle continues with the quantitative phase, which is
based on stochastic modelling, stochastic analysis and numerical evaluation. First, an
appropriate stochastic dynamic model instantiation of the ATM concept design is developed in
an iterative way, including human cognitive behaviour and with verification against the results
of the qualitative safety assessment phase (lower right drawing). The format of this model is
dynamically coloured Petri net (DCPN). Next, the accident risk is assessed for this stochastic
dynamical model (lower middle and middle drawing) by making use of the collision and wake
vortex risk models available within TOPAZ. Subsequently, the safety/capacity critical elements
are identified (lower left drawing). Finally, these results are fed back to the ATM concept
designers.
An important TOPAZ step is to validate to a certain level that a risk assessment exercise is
performed to an acceptable degree, without the need to first employ very expensive large-scale
real-time simulations of new concepts. As a result of the underlying stochastic analysis
framework, such a validation can be done by executing the following activities:
• Judge the level of conservatism of the assumptions adopted during the development of the
DCPN instantiation for the situation considered. This should be done with active
involvement of operational and design experts;
• Verify the correctness of the instantiated DCPN versus the results of the qualitative
assessment and the assumptions adopted. This should be done by stochastic analysis
TOPAZ experts, with at least one who was not involved in instantiating the DCPN;
• Verify the correctness of the mathematical transformations applied to the instantiated
stochastic dynamical model. This should be done by applying mathematical tools from
stochastic analysis theory;
• Verify that the various assessment activities have been executed according to the
unambiguous mathematical model developed, including the decomposition. This should be
done by stochastic analysis experts.
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7 Conclusion
This article has given an outline of the TOPAZ methodology to assess advanced ATM on
safety/capacity, and has illustrated that this approach may provide effective feedback to
designers of advanced ATM. This feedback is an essential source of information in the process
of building a modern safety case for the ATM design. One of the major features of the new
approach is that it incorporates advanced human cognitive modelling. This provides a way to
assess the effect on safety/capacity of new technological advances, including changes in
operator workload due to these advances.
Currently, a high level of expertise in stochastic analysis is required for an effective application
of the methodology. One should however, be aware that the need for sophisticated mathematical
expertise is well accepted in other complex design areas of civil aviation, such as the area of
aerodynamic optimisation of aircraft structures.
Recently, through a joint effort of Eurocontrol and the FAA, in collaboration with some key
developers of aviation risk assessment tools, an overview was produced that outlines the
relevant approaches currently under development and/or in use for the safe separation
assessment of advanced procedures in air traffic (Cohen and Hockaday, 1998).
In addition to TOPAZ, four other collision risk directed approaches, Analytic Blunder Risk
Model (ABRM), Airspace Simulation and Analysis for Terminal instrument procedures
(ASAT), ICAO’s Collision Risk Model and Reduced Aircraft Separation Risk Assessment
Model (RASRAM), were identified and reviewed; TOPAZ appeared to be most advanced in
going beyond established approaches.
8 Further reading
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